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Military & Police Backing:
Considering the sociological and theological parallels between the jihad forces in Maluku and the FPI (Front Pembela Islam) vigilantes in Jakarta (Tempo, Jan. 23, 2000: 40-46), it is most likely that the jihad forces are also politically backed by Wiranto and Djadja Suparman, two top army generals who have currently been sacked by President Wahid.
In East Java, military backing for these Muslim militias comes from Mayor General Sudi Silalahi, chief of the Brawijaya army command. I base this on the fact that Sudi Silalahi strongly denied the existence of military links with a bomb blast in Nganjuk, East Java, on May 30, 2000 (Jakarta Post, June 5, 2000). This denial comes after it had been found out that the bomb that exploded in the Suzuki Carry AB 7244 van and killed the driver and a passenger had all the indications that it was owned or connected to the jihad forces leader in Yogyakarta, which had been confirmed by the Indonesian Police Commader, General Rusdihardjo (SiaR, May 31, 2000; Jakarta Post, June 1, 2000; Detikcom, June 2, 2000).
It has also been established that the only casualty in this accident, Rifzikka Helta (32), a Yogyakarta resident, had previously spent two weeks in Ambon and that one of the survivors, Azmi Ishaq (32) is a student at the Al Ikhlas boarding school in Jember, East Java (Jakarta Post, June 3, 2000).
Apart from General Sudi Silalahi, the Police commander of East Java, Mayor General Da'i Bachtiar also allowed the thousands of jihad troops to board the ships from Surabaya to Ambon, shipping their weapons separately in soap boxes and containers which reached Ambon after the arrival of the troops. This was arranged by a courier company in Surabaya owned by a certain Haji Doellah (personal communication with a source in Surabaya, June 18, 2000). In an interview with the pro-jihad daily newspaper, Republika (April 20, 2000), the police commander also denied that tens of East Java police agents had returned their badges to join the jihad forces to Maluku. This probably means the opposite, namely that many police agents had indeed swelled the ranks of the jihad forces on their mission to Maluku.
The jihad forces must also have widespread support from police commanders in West Java, Jakarta, and Ambon, since they could freely carry out their military training near Bogor, brandish their swords publicly when they demonstrated at the parliament. And, in Ambon, enable their containers full of weapons to be disembarked at the harbour, which lies in Muslim-controlled Waihoang, instead of in the Navy harbour of Halong or to be moved immediately to the Pattimura army headquarters in Ambon.
Finally, the jihad forces must also have support within the top ranks of the Indonesian Navy, since no efforts were made to prohibit the state-owned ships, such as KM Rinjani, from boarding the Muslim vigilantes whose mission was clearly to fight Christian Moluccans whom their leader accuse of planning to set up a separate, Christian state (see interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib in Panji Masyarakat, April 26, 2000, on zulfan@iname.com, April 28, 2000).
In that interview, the jihad forces commander admits having a hotline to Armed Forces Commander Admiral Widodo A.S., through a 60-year old man called Bambang, who had donated 1,050 m2 land to the Muslim boarding school of Ja'far.
This probably means that as a Navy admiral, the armed forces commander may still be able to persuade his Navy subordinates to turn a blind eye on the exodus of jihad troops to Maluku.
Source: GJA
Considering the sociological and theological parallels between the jihad forces in Maluku and the FPI (Front Pembela Islam) vigilantes in Jakarta (Tempo, Jan. 23, 2000: 40-46), it is most likely that the jihad forces are also politically backed by Wiranto and Djadja Suparman, two top army generals who have currently been sacked by President Wahid.
In East Java, military backing for these Muslim militias comes from Mayor General Sudi Silalahi, chief of the Brawijaya army command. I base this on the fact that Sudi Silalahi strongly denied the existence of military links with a bomb blast in Nganjuk, East Java, on May 30, 2000 (Jakarta Post, June 5, 2000). This denial comes after it had been found out that the bomb that exploded in the Suzuki Carry AB 7244 van and killed the driver and a passenger had all the indications that it was owned or connected to the jihad forces leader in Yogyakarta, which had been confirmed by the Indonesian Police Commader, General Rusdihardjo (SiaR, May 31, 2000; Jakarta Post, June 1, 2000; Detikcom, June 2, 2000).
It has also been established that the only casualty in this accident, Rifzikka Helta (32), a Yogyakarta resident, had previously spent two weeks in Ambon and that one of the survivors, Azmi Ishaq (32) is a student at the Al Ikhlas boarding school in Jember, East Java (Jakarta Post, June 3, 2000).
Apart from General Sudi Silalahi, the Police commander of East Java, Mayor General Da'i Bachtiar also allowed the thousands of jihad troops to board the ships from Surabaya to Ambon, shipping their weapons separately in soap boxes and containers which reached Ambon after the arrival of the troops. This was arranged by a courier company in Surabaya owned by a certain Haji Doellah (personal communication with a source in Surabaya, June 18, 2000). In an interview with the pro-jihad daily newspaper, Republika (April 20, 2000), the police commander also denied that tens of East Java police agents had returned their badges to join the jihad forces to Maluku. This probably means the opposite, namely that many police agents had indeed swelled the ranks of the jihad forces on their mission to Maluku.
The jihad forces must also have widespread support from police commanders in West Java, Jakarta, and Ambon, since they could freely carry out their military training near Bogor, brandish their swords publicly when they demonstrated at the parliament. And, in Ambon, enable their containers full of weapons to be disembarked at the harbour, which lies in Muslim-controlled Waihoang, instead of in the Navy harbour of Halong or to be moved immediately to the Pattimura army headquarters in Ambon.
Finally, the jihad forces must also have support within the top ranks of the Indonesian Navy, since no efforts were made to prohibit the state-owned ships, such as KM Rinjani, from boarding the Muslim vigilantes whose mission was clearly to fight Christian Moluccans whom their leader accuse of planning to set up a separate, Christian state (see interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib in Panji Masyarakat, April 26, 2000, on zulfan@iname.com, April 28, 2000).
In that interview, the jihad forces commander admits having a hotline to Armed Forces Commander Admiral Widodo A.S., through a 60-year old man called Bambang, who had donated 1,050 m2 land to the Muslim boarding school of Ja'far.
This probably means that as a Navy admiral, the armed forces commander may still be able to persuade his Navy subordinates to turn a blind eye on the exodus of jihad troops to Maluku.
Source: GJA
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